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Abstract 
This Essay provides a glimpse into the 34th Economics Institute for 
Law Professors, which took place in Estes Park, Colorado, from 
June 17 to 27, 2019. The Institute was hosted by the Law & 
Economics Center at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George 
Mason University, and has been previously attended by more than 
850 law professors worldwide. The goal of  the Institute is “to help 
participants enhance their understanding of  economics and broaden 
their analytical tools in order to introduce greater economic 
sophistication and policy relevance to their professional work.” While 
the Institute consisted of  forty-two classes spanning ten days, the focus 
of  this Essay will be on only three of  those classes: (1) “Behavioral 
Law & Economics,” (2) “There Ain’t No Such Thing as an 
Externality,” and (3) “Economics of  Innovation and Dynamic 
Competition.” For reasons that will hopefully become clear, I have 
titled my overview of  these classes “Totalitarian Nudges,” “Illusory 
Externalities,” and “Utopian Benefits” respectively.  
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To regulate more, or regulate less, that is the question: 
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of  market fluctuations, 
Or to take arms against creative destruction 
And by opposing … end it?1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Law & Economics Center (“LEC”) at the Antonin Scalia Law School 
at George Mason University seeks to ensure that “the public servants who 
create and shape laws possess a basic understanding of  economic concepts 
and methods.”2 Since 1974, the LEC “has provided the classroom where 
federal and state judges, state attorneys general, law professors, and other 
legal professionals have been trained in basic economics, accounting, 
statistics, regulatory analysis, and related disciplines.”3 Over “5,000 federal 
judges and state court judges representing all 50 states and the District of  
Columbia, including three current U.S. Supreme Court Justices, have 
participated in at least one of  the LEC’s education programs.”4 
The LEC is comprised of  six divisions, including the Henry G. Manne 
Program in Law & Economics Studies, which “promotes law and 
economics scholarship by funding faculty research and hosting policy-
relevant research roundtables and academic conferences.”5 One of  the 
events hosted by the LEC’s Henry Manne Program is the Economics 
Institute for Law Professors. “More than 850 law professors worldwide 
have attended the LEC’s Economics Institutes.”6 
This Essay provides a glimpse into the 34th Economics Institute for 
Law Professors. While the Institute consisted of  forty-two classes 
 
1 Adapted from William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of  Hamlet, Prince of  Denmark, 
act 3, sc. 1. 
2 About, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., https://mason
lec.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Law and Economics Center, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., 
https://masonlec.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
6 34th Economics Institute for Law Professors, L. & ECON. CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN 
SCALIA L. SCH., https://masonlec.org/events/economics-institute/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2020). 
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spanning ten days, the focus here will be on only three of  those classes: 
(1) “Behavioral Law & Economics,” (2) “There Ain’t No Such Thing as 
an Externality,” and (3) “Economics of  Innovation and Dynamic 
Competition.”7 For reasons that will hopefully become clear, I have titled 
my overview of  these classes Totalitarian Nudges, Illusory Externalities, 
and Utopian Benefits respectively. These phrases likely represent my sole 
unique contribution to this Essay, but I hope the reader will nonetheless 
find my reviews worthwhile. 
I. TOTALITARIAN NUDGES 
The Behavioral Law & Economics class was taught by Professor 
Kathryn Zeiler, Professor of  Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston 
University School of  Law. The assigned readings were EYAL ZAMIR & 
DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018): Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, and Joshua 
D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1033 (2012). This 
section will focus on the Wright and Ginsburg article. 
Most people are familiar with at least some aspects of  behavioral 
economics, which focuses on decision-making errors people make that 
might undermine conclusions of  traditional economics founded on 
rational actors. In addition, most people are also familiar with the “nudge” 
policy application of  these insights. While most of  the media coverage of  
behavioral economics and the “nudge” phenomenon has been positive, 
Wright and Ginsburg point out that there are a number of  reasons to slow 
down the rush to implement the accompanying policies. 
Wright and Ginsburg base their critique at least in part on the 
following. First, biases documented in experimental laboratory settings 
have been shown to dissipate when confronted with real-world market 
discipline and incentives. Second, the presence of  errors in decision-
making does not necessitate a conclusion that those errors are irrational, 
and behaviorists have failed to make that distinction. Third, behaviorists 
fail to account for the costs of  policy errors. Fourth, once behaviorists 
dismiss revealed preferences as indicative of  welfare, it becomes extremely 
difficult, if  not impossible, to justify a policy maker’s determination of  
“true” preferences as deserving any particular deference. Fifth, even 
assuming all the foregoing criticisms are misplaced, behaviorists fail to 
account for the cost of  denying individuals process freedom. Sixth and 
 
7 See generally, Thirty-Fourth Economics Institute for Law Professors Agenda, L. & ECON. 
CTR., GEO. MASON ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., https://masonlec.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/Agenda-Mason-LEC-34th-Economics-Institute-for-Law-Professors-
June-2019.pdf  (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
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finally, behaviorists fail to account for the risk of  paternalistic government 
intervention in individual decision-making creating a slippery-slope to 
more pervasive and coercive government regulation of  individual liberty. 
Each of  these criticisms will be examined in more detail (albeit still briefly) 
below. 
A. Documented Biases Dissipate when Confronted with  
Market Discipline and Incentives 
Wright and Ginsburg note that “much if  not most of  the data 
suggesting cognitive biases affect individual decisionmaking are drawn 
from experimental settings and the bias has not been shown to persist in 
the presence of  market institutions.”8 For example, “Charles Plott and 
Kathryn Zeiler demonstrate that observed gaps [between willingness-to-
accept and willingness-to-pay]9 can be explained by misconceptions about 
experimental protocols and the experimental task; when those 
misconceptions are dispelled and a full set of  experimental controls is 
employed to eliminate them, contrary to prospect theory, such gaps 
disappear.”10 In addition, findings from other studies “suggest framing 
 
8 Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (2012) (citing 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 31, 51 (2011)). 
9 Cf. Wright & Ginsburg, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1042 (“The key experimental finding 
of  prospect theory is that individuals are, in many cases, reluctant to sell a good endowed 
to them when offered a sum greater than they are willing to pay to acquire the good.”) 
(citing Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of  Consumer Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behav. 
& Org. 39, 43-44 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless 
Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1041-42 (1991)).10 Wright 
& Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1046–47 (citing Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange 
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of  Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 
97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1454-56 (2007); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The 
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and 
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 532–35 (2005)). 
10 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1046–47 (citing Charles R. Plott & Kathryn 
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of  Endowment Effect Theory and 
Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1454-56 (2007); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn 
Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject 
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 
532–35 (2005)). 
2020]  TOTALITARIAN NUDGES, ILLUSORY EXTERNALITIES, & UTOPIAN BENEFITS 273 
 
effects can be reduced or eliminated at low cost without the extensive 
interventions proposed by libertarian paternalists.”11 
B. Behaviorists have Failed to Account for Rational Errors  
Wright and Ginsburg note that even if  robust evidence of  irrationality 
in markets existed, “such evidence would have to be interpreted with care; 
the challenge would be to distinguish truly irrational behavior from 
rationally made and therefore efficient mistakes.”12 They go on to explain 
that “efficient mistakes” occur when “rational economic actors economize 
on both information and transaction costs. In short, not all errors imply 
irrationality because perfect decisionmaking would be costly.”13 
Unfortunately, “behavioral law and economics literature . . . fails to 
distinguish between rational and irrational errors, assuming instead that 
error reduction is always efficient.”14  
By way of  example, Wright and Ginsburg take on the assertion that 
“consumers consistently underestimate their future borrowing due to a 
potpourri of  behavioral biases such as imperfect self-control, hyperbolic 
discounting, and systematic underestimation of  the probability of  negative 
consequences.”15 They go on to note that this “predatory lender” 
interpretation of  the credit market “gives rise to several testable 
hypotheses about the underlying behavioral theories.”16 However, the 
relevant data “bear out none of  these expectations.”17 Rather, “[t]he 
available data strongly suggest consumers make rational choices in the 
credit card market.”18 While there are error rates, “the upper bound of  the 
 
11 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1048 (citing Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2005)). Cf. id. at 1035 (“the 
behavioral law and economics regulatory agenda reflects a common philosophical source-
-so-called libertarian paternalism. That seemingly oxymoronic phrase . . . is intended to 
describe legal interventions that . . . increase the individual’s economic welfare by freeing 
him from the limitations of  his cognitive biases . . . without limiting his choices”). 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1049. 
15 Id. (citing Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004)). 
16 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1049 (offering three “testable hypotheses 
about the underlying behavioral theories.”). These hypotheses are: “First, we should 
expect to see a significant majority of  consumers selecting the wrong card-that is, the 
card that does not maximize interest-cost savings net of  any annual fee paid. Second, we 
should expect the consumers’ error rate, if  it is the product of  irrationality, to remain 
invariant to the cost of  the error. Third, we should expect consumers who carry monthly 
balances instead of  paying them off  to hold cards with high rewards and no annual 
fee.” Id. 
17 Id. at 1050 (citing Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? 
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=843826.). 
18 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1050. 
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initial error rate suggests switching costs would outweigh any potential 
gains consumers might realize from changing cards,” and thus “the error 
rate is efficient.”19 
Nonetheless, as Wright and Ginsburg explain, Elizabeth Warren’s 
asserts that “[a] high error rate implies irrationality, and irrationality implies 
the need for choice-reducing regulation.”20 Unfortunately, this “leap from 
identifying the error rate . . . illustrates what Harold Demsetz famously 
called the Nirvana Fallacy – the failure to ask: compared to what?”21 This 
fallacy “threatens to subject consumers to a serious policy error by 
conflating rational choice with irrational behavior––that is, by ignoring 
switching and other costs incurred everywhere except in Nirvana – and by 
avoiding comparative institutional analysis.”22 
C. Behaviorists Fail to Account for the Costs of Policy Errors 
As Wright and Ginsburg put it: 
The inevitability of  policy errors derives from the 
insurmountable theoretical and empirical obstacles to 
identifying any one person’s, let alone the distribution of  all 
persons’, “true preferences.” One type of  policy error will occur 
when a behavioral intervention is aimed at seemingly irrational 
behavior that is in fact rational for the decisionmaker in 
question . . . . A second type of  policy error will occur when an 
intervention designed to improve the decisionmaking of  truly 
irrational economic agents imposes costs, as it inevitably will, 
upon all those who are not irrational and for whom the same 
decision is not an error.23 
Given this inevitability of  error on the side of  government 
intervention, and the concomitant costs generated by these errors, it 
should be obvious that one can only claim behaviorist interventions are 
efficient if  one accounts for these expected costs. Put another way, “the 
question remains whether the social costs saved are greater than the social 
 
19 Id. (citing Elizabeth Warren, Economic Model Almost Working or Broken?, Credit Slips 
(Dec. 26, 2006, 04:12 PM) (http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/economic
_model_.html). 
20 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1051 (citing Elizabeth Warren, Economic Model 
Almost Working or Broken?, Credit Slips (Dec. 26, 2006, 4:12 PM), https://www.credit
slips.org/creditslips/2006/12/economic_model_.html). 
21 Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 1–3 (1969)). 
22 Id. at 1051–52. 
23 Id. at 1052. Cf. id. at 1061 (“After ruling out revealed preferences as expressions 
of  true preferences, the behaviorist lacks a coherent principle to identify welfare-
maximizing choices.”).  
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costs of  intervention.”24 Without addressing this question, one runs the 
risk of  the proposed cure being worse than the asserted harm. However, 
Wright and Ginsburg argue that an “expanding behavioral law and 
economics agenda largely disregards these risks.”25 
D. Who Decides a Person’s “True” Preferences? 
As Wright and Ginsburg point out, “behavioral law and economics’ 
claim to welfare-increasing intervention requires one to disregard the 
neoclassical assumption that actual behavior reveals evidence of  
welfare.”26 If, as the behaviorists’ argument goes, the preferences revealed 
by actual choices are “irrational” because they are distorted by various 
cognitive biases, then the claim is that, but for those biases, the individual 
would prefer different options, and this latter choice would be the 
individual’s “true” preference. Government intervention is then justified 
to help individuals reach their true preferences. This approach, however, 
raises the question: “How then do behavioral economists identify true 
preferences?”27 
One approach advanced by behaviorists is to posit multiple selves 
“with conflicting interests owing to different time perspectives.”28 
However, “[e]conomics does not provide a basis for identifying which of  
the multiple selves’ decisions expresses the individual’s ‘true’ preferences 
for the purposes of  welfare analysis.”29 Ultimately:  
After ruling out revealed preferences as expressions of  true 
preferences, the behaviorist lacks a coherent principle to identify 
welfare-maximizing choices. Indeed, without revealed 
preferences, economic science simply cannot do so. The 
behaviorists can only declare by fiat what they expect a rational 
individual would or should do – thereby justifying the 
imposition of  correct choices by a third party, contrary to the 
behaviorist promise to maximize economic welfare by the 
individuals’ own lights and undermining the behaviorist claim 
to the prefix “libertarian.”30 
In other words, it is the paternalism that ultimately takes precedence for 
those advocating libertarian paternalism. 
 
24 Id. at 1052–53. 
25 Id. at 1053. 
26 Id. at 1060. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1061–62. 
276 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21 
 
E. The Cost of Denying Individuals Process Freedom 
Amartya Sen has written about “the process aspect of  freedom,” 
which includes: 
(i) decisional autonomy of  the choices to be made, and (ii) 
immunity from interference by others. The former is concerned 
with the operative role that a person has in the process of  
choice, and the crucial issue here is self-decision, e.g., whether 
the choices are being made by the person herself––not (on her 
behalf) by other individuals or institutions.31 
Wright and Ginsburg argue that behaviorists “in general do not place 
any value upon the ‘the process aspect of  freedom’ or ‘decisional 
autonomy.’”32 This is concerning, at least in part, because “[l]imiting the 
range of  decisions to be made by individuals or burdening those who 
would make an officially disfavored choice--not saving enough, eating 
unhealthful foods, etc.--tends to infantilize the public.”33 By way of  
evidence to support this proposition, Wright and Ginsburg point to data 
on rates of  entrepreneurship in formerly communist countries. As they 
put it, “we would expect people who were raised in a paternalistic state, 
and hence relieved of  the need to make many important decisions for 
themselves, to have less well-developed decisionmaking skills and to be 
more risk averse.”34 
In general, “entrepreneurs . . . exhibit a particular mode of  
information processing, or cognitive style.” They are more alert 
to opportunities that require linking previously unrelated 
information. Indeed, the experimental literature strongly tends 
to validate Israel Kirzner’s description of  the Austrian tradition, 
which “postulates a tendency for profit opportunities to be 
discovered and grasped by routine-resisting entrepreneurial market 
participants.”  
In a socialist state, however, resistance is futile. Uncritical 
acceptance of  the party line is essential to survival, much less 
advancement. Of  course, there are choices to be made: Shall I 
read Pravda or Izvestia? Yet the choice set has been limited by 
the state in a way that serves the state’s ends, not those of  the 
individual. As Milan Simecka so graphically recounted from his 
personal experience after the Prague Spring of  1968, the 
 
31 Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of  the Market Mechanism 
in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 519, 523–24 (1993) (as quoted 
in Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1069). 
32 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1069. 
33 Id. at 1070. 
34 Id. at 1073. 
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Communist Party of  Czechoslovakia controlled the citizenry by 
depriving individuals of  their decisional autonomy in only three 
respects: The state determined their housing, their occupation, 
and their children’s education. That is why this professor of  
mathematics in mid-career became an operator of  construction 
equipment.35 
And relevant data appears to bear out the authors’ concerns: 
Transnational comparisons using data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor produce strong evidence that, even 
after controlling for relevant variables, all countries with a 
communist past have a lower rate of  entrepreneurship activity 
than do other countries. A recent study concludes that even now 
those unfortunate countries have “low levels of  entrepreneurial 
human capital that have been engendered by decades of  
existence under a central planning system that tended to blunt 
individual incentives.” As one would expect, however, the level 
of  entrepreneurship is “significantly lower in Russia.” A study 
conducted jointly by Russian and U.S. scholars concludes that 
“[t]he absence of  freedom of  decision-making in the most 
important resource – the workforce – and the ‘no-choice’ 
employment situation were two fundamental obstacles to the 
development of  entrepreneurship” during the communist era. 
After the fall of  communism, moreover, Russian entrepreneurs 
tended to be younger than was typical elsewhere; only the young 
were unscathed by their nation’s paternalistic history.36 
F. A Slippery-Slope to More Coercive Government Regulation  
of Individual Liberty 
As Wright and Ginsburg note, “of  course, no proponent of  regulation 
based upon the findings of  behavioral economics espouses a regime 
remotely as encompassing and restrictive as even the least oppressive of  
the late, unlamented communist regimes.”37 Nonetheless, “there is reason 
 
35 Id. at 1073–74 (quoting Amir N. Licht, The Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law 
Can Do About It, 28 Comp. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 817, 819 (2007); Israel M. Kirzner, 
Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. 
LIT. 60, 71 (1997)) (citing MILAN SIMECKA, RESTORATION OF ORDER: THE 
NORMALIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1969–1976 (A.G. Brain trans., 1984)). 
36 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1074–75 (quoting Martin Robson, Explaining 
Cross-National Variations in Entrepreneurship: The Role of  Social Protection and Political Culture, 
28 Comp. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 863, 890 (2007); Ruta Aidis et al., Institutions and 
Entrepreneurship Development in Russia: A Comparative Perspective, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 656, 
657, 670 (2008); Alexander I. Ageev et al., Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union and Post-
Socialist Russia, 7 SMALL BUS. ECON. 365, 369 (1995)). 
37 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1075 (citation omitted). 
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to believe . . . they would put us on a slippery slope – or push us that much 
further down the slope than we have already slid.”38 
To begin, “[p]aternalistic policies are, by nature, likely to be slippery” 
because they “are expressed in regulations specifically adopted, at least 
initially, for the benefit of  those regulated and, if  those individuals do not 
want to be regulated for their own good – which is hardly unusual – the 
regulators will likely deem ever more stringent measures necessary.”39 In 
addition, “regulatory missions tend to expand; ‘mission creep’ assures that 
the government agency will require more money and more staff  over time, 
forestalling any danger of  the agency accomplishing its mission and 
becoming redundant.”40 
Finally, while this section began with the proposition that “no 
proponent of  regulation based upon the findings of  behavioral economics 
espouses . . . communist regimes,”41 a qualification may be in order. 
Specifically, Wright and Ginsburg draw a line from the Critical Legal 
Studies (“CLS”) movement to at least some modern behaviorists. 
Beginning with CLS, Wright and Ginsburg argue: 
Overtly a leftist movement, CLS turned out to be little more 
than a warmed-over species of  Marxism, as it had evolved in 
the hothouse of  radical European social theorists such as 
Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, and others of  the 
Frankfurt School of  neo-Marxist critical theorists, Antonio 
Gramsci, a leader of  the Communist Party in Italy, and Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and other “poststructuralist” 
philosophers. The self-declared purpose of  the CLS movement 
was “to provide a critique of  liberal legal and political 
philosophy” that would show the “liberal embrace of  the rule 
of  law is actually incompatible with other essential principles of  
liberal political thinking.42 
Particularly noteworthy in terms of  connecting CLS to the 
behaviorists is the concept of  “false consciousness.” 43 Again, here are 
Wright and Ginsburg: 
 
38 Id. Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalistic Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 411, 412 (2007). 
39 Id. (“[F]ederal laws protecting the occupants of  automobiles provide a familiar 
historical example.”). 
40 Id. at 1076 (citing Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of  Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 
3 (2002); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of  
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 117 (1987)).  
41 Id. at 1075. 
42 Id. at 1082 (quoting ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL 
CRITIQUE 3 (1990)) (citations omitted). 
43 Wright and Ginsburg note that the phrase “false consciousness” is often attributed 
to Marx, but the “phrase, if  not the concept, seems actually to derive from an early 
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Key to the CLS analysis was the notion of  “false 
consciousness,” meaning the “holding of  false or inaccurate 
beliefs that are contrary to one’s own social interest and which 
thereby contribute to the maintenance of  the disadvantaged 
position of  the self  or the group.” Like the presumed gap 
between revealed preferences and “true preferences,” assuming 
a wedge between reality and the perceptions of  others provides 
a space to be filled by some combination of  reeducation and 
outright coercion. Duncan Kennedy encapsulates these Maoist 
tendencies in his proposal that professors and janitors at the 
Harvard Law School be required to trade places for one month 
each year. Kennedy described the ultimate goal of  CLS as 
“building a left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join 
together with a mass movement for the radical transformation 
of  American society.44 
Wright and Ginsburg go on to argue that the “end of  the communist 
era in Russia and Eastern Europe dealt a blow to CLS, as it did to all leftist 
movements. The worldwide triumph of  socialism, which had long seemed 
inevitable to so many, now seemed more improbable than ever.”45 
Eventually, continue Wright and Ginsburg, at least some of  these scholars 
found a new home in behavioral law and economics, where “more than 
sophomoric understanding of  economics was not required,”46 and which 
“shares with CLS the paternalistic premise that the poor wretches to be 
benefitted by the insights of  their governors suffer from a form of  ‘false 
consciousness.’”47 
II. ILLUSORY EXTERNALITIES 
The class titled “There Ain’t No Such Thing as an Externality,” was 
taught by Terry Anderson, John and Jean DeNault Senior Fellow at the 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The assigned reading was TERRY 
L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, Property Rights for the Common Pool, in 
 
translation of  a letter Friedrich Engels wrote to Franz Mehring.” Wright & Ginsburg, 
supra note 8, at 1082 n.230 (citing MICHÈLE BARRETT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: FROM 
MARX TO FOUCAULT 5-6 (1991)); cf. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1088 n.232 (“As 
one student of  Kennedy’s put it, the phrase ‘implies that all those who disagree with you 
are stupid.’”) (quoting RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 166 (1999)). 
44 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1082–83 (quoting John T. Jost, Negative Illusions: 
Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 397, 400 (1995); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of  
Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 610 (1982)). 
45 Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1083. 
46 Id. at 1084. 
47 Id. at 1085. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
Economists generally advocate for free market exchange as the 
efficient way to organize an economy. This preference can be understood 
to rest at least in part on the proposition that individuals know best what 
they value and are therefore best positioned to maximize the benefits of  
exchange. A corollary of  this is that economists generally consider 
government intervention in the market inefficient because the 
interventions are likely to distort incentives in a way that results in a sub-
optimal allocation of  resources. However, even economists who generally 
favor free markets typically accept certain justifications for government 
interference in markets, including: (1) externalities, (2) public goods, (3) 
information asymmetries, and (4) monopolies.48  
Externalities are understood to be costs (and benefits) that are not 
internalized by the producer. Given that capitalism rests on the 
proposition that free market exchange will lead to efficient resource 
allocation in response to pricing signals, a failure on the part of  producers 
to internalize their costs leads to inefficient allocation of  resources. Thus, 
so the argument goes, externalities might justify government intervention.49 
However, if  we consider that “externalities” are simply a manifestation of  
a failure to assign property rights, then, when feasible and under certain 
conditions, assigning property rights would allow for efficient trading.50 
This would certainly undermine the justification for government 
intervention based on externalities. At least some of  the key propositions 
here are as follows:  
First, to assert that Person A is imposing a cost on Person B, and that 
this cost should be internalized by Person A, assumes that Person B has a 
right to be free of  the asserted imposition. However, this assumption may 
not be able to bear the weight sought to be placed upon it by advocates of  
regulation in the name of  externalities.51 As Anderson puts it: 
 
48 Cf. ANDERSON & LIBECAP, Property Rights for the Common Pool, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH at 54 n.3 (“[W]e combine 
most government interventions - regulation, tax, subsidies, and related technology and 
performance standards together as Coase did in describing them as the ‘Pigouvian 
Tradition.’”) (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 39, 
54 n.3 (1960)). 
49 It could be the case that the government “fix” to internalize an externality is costlier 
than the externality itself. Additionally, there are alternative, market-based solutions to 
internalize externalities. 
50 This is the fundamental insights of  Ronald Coase’s seminal article on externalities 
and property rights. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–
44 (1960). 
51 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A 
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 56 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (“[T]he conventional 
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[D]eclaring that person A’s use of  a resource creates an 
externality for person B complicates creating environmental 
markets by assuming that person B has a right to be free of  the 
costs of  A’s use. If  such a right existed, Coase asks why B is not 
requiring compensation from A for A’s imposition of  a cost on 
B. Why is there no market transaction? If  the answer is that B 
does not have such a right, then the question is why B is not 
paying A to cease creating the cost? In summary, if  there is a 
missing market because property rights are not defined, then 
there is a possibility for a market solution if  they can be 
established.52 
Alternatively, one might frame the issue as one of  reciprocal costs:  
Coase argued that property rights assign benefits and costs and 
promote bargaining, but his emphasis on the reciprocal nature 
of  costs, is underappreciated. To see the relevance of  reciprocal 
costs . . . , consider one of  Coase’s parables, the conflict between 
the doctor whose practice depends on quiet and the 
confectioner whose candy production generates noise. If  these 
two activities are located adjacent to one another, there will be 
conflict for use of  the airspace as a medium for transmission of  
sound waves. The question is whether the doctor has a right to 
produce medical services in a quiet environment or whether the 
confectioner has a right to produce candy and in the process 
generate sound and vibration. Coase’s point was that costs to 
one party are a benefit to the other and vice versa.53 
Either way, the point is that there is good reason to push back on bald 
assertions to the effect that Person A is imposing a cost on Person B, and 
that therefore regulation is required to ensure Person A internalizes the 
cost of  their activities. 
Second, even assuming that we are justified in claiming that Person A 
is creating an externality as understood in the conventional sense, there is 
reason to question whether government intervention is obviously 
preferable to market- or bargaining-based solutions. Again, quoting 
Anderson: 
Our contention is that as much attention should be given to 
political economy issues associated with “government failure,” as 
are given to ‘market failure.’ Recognition of  the transaction costs 
 
approach diverts attention from the questions of  why property rights do not exist and 
whether government instruments would still be preferable if  rights could be established.”). 
52 Id. at 63; see also id. at 68 (“Perhaps no other lesson is associated more with Coase 
than the idea of  bargaining to resolve conflicting demands for resources.”). 
53 Id. at 61–62. 
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of  government action will lead to examination of  a larger range 
of  policies that includes more local and private market solutions.54 
Anderson’s point is similar to the point that Wright and Ginsburg make 
when invoking the Nirvana Fallacy: while markets might produce certain 
inefficiencies—so do proposed alternatives such as government 
intervention. 
Finally, granting government the role of  assigning property rights and 
setting various “rules of  the game” to reduce transaction costs does not 
undermine a pro-market bargaining approach as hypocritical. Anderson 
acknowledges that “recognition of  common property and definition and 
enforcement of  formal property rights involves government intervention, 
and there will be politics involved in that process as well.”55 However, 
“once the rights are recognized, agents can devise solutions through 
markets.”56 
III. UTOPIAN BENEFITS  
The class on the “Economics of  Innovation and Dynamic 
Competition” was taught by Prof. John Yun, and the assigned readings 
were Ginsburg & Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of  Antitrust 
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2012), and BAUMOL ET AL., GOOD 
CAPITALISM, BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND 
PROSPERITY 15–59 (2007). 
The general consensus is that monopolies are bad at least in part 
because they create what is often referred to as “deadweight loss.” 
Deadweight loss refers to the loss of  consumer and producer welfare 
attributable to the monopolist’s expected use of  pricing power to 
maximize its profit at the expense of  consumers. In order to better 
understand this, we need to first understand what is expected under a 
model of  perfect competition. 
In perfect competition, prices are determined by the interaction of  
supply and demand. Consumers typically demand more quantity of  a 
product as its price goes down. In the standard supply-and-demand model, 
this is represented by a demand curve that slopes downward to the right, 
with price on the vertical Y-axis, while quantity is on the horizontal X-axis. 
Thus, the quantity demanded is low when the price is high, and high when 
the price is low. On the other hand, producers are typically incentivized to 
increase output as price increases. This is represented via an upward-
sloping supply curve, which crosses the downward-sloping demand curve 
at some point.  
 
54 Id. at 56–57 n.9. 
55 Id. at 57 n.10. 
56 Id. 
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The point at which the demand and supply curves cross (the 
“Equilibrium Point”) is typically understood to provide us with the 
efficient price and quantity of  a product (specifically, we draw a horizontal 
line from the intersect point to the price, and a vertical line to the 
quantity).57 One way of  understanding this is to assume that any producer 
that tries to charge more than the equilibrium price will lose the 
competition for customers to the producers selling the same product for 
less, while any producer that tries to undercut the competition by charging 
less than the equilibrium will be failing to maximize its profit, which is 
typically unsustainable because, among other things, investors and 
employers will eventually depart for the companies able to provide higher 
salaries and better returns.58 
The equilibrium price/quantity creates both consumer and producer 
surplus. Consumer surplus is created because the area below the demand 
curve but above the price line represents consumers who would have paid 
more for the product. In other words, these consumers received more 
value than they paid for. Meanwhile, the area below the price line but above 
the supply curve represents producer surplus in that producers would have 
been willing to sell for less at those quantities but received more. The 
perfect competition model is set forth in Diagram 1. 
Diagram 159 
 
 
57 See generally Economic efficiency, KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/
economics-finance-domain/microeconomics/consumer-producer-surplus/deadweight-
loss-tutorial/a/demand-supply-and-efficiency-cnx (defining economic efficiency). 
58 Cf. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of  
Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 13 (2012) (“because economic theory teaches 
that successful predatory pricing depends upon the firm incurring certain losses in the 
present and somehow more than recouping those losses in the future, it is regarded as an 
unlikely business practice”). 
59 File:Economic-surpluses.svg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia
.org/wiki/File:Economic-surpluses.svg. 
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In the case of  a monopoly, however, there are no competitors to 
discipline the monopolist—either by undercutting an excessive price, or 
by punishing a failure to maximize profit. This allows the monopolist to 
produce less, and charge more, than would otherwise be expected. The 
new price/quantity (“Pm” & “Qm”) will be determined by the intersection 
of  the marginal revenue (“MR”) and marginal cost (“MC”) of  the 
monopolist. The details of  how these new curves MC and MR interact to 
determine the optimal price/quantity from the perspective of  the 
monopolist is beyond the scope of  this essay, but the graphical 
representation is set forth in Diagram 2 below.60 Importantly for our 
purposes, while there remains consumer and producer surplus (with the 
balance unsurprisingly shifting in favor of  the producer), there has been a 
loss of  overall social welfare, and this is represented by the deadweight 
loss in Diagram 2. 
Diagram 261 
 
In light of  the foregoing, government intervention is arguably 
warranted to restore efficient competition and thereby restore the lost social 
 
60 See generally Motley Fool Staff, What Is The Relationship Between Marginal Revenue and 
Marginal Cost as a Company Increases Output, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 1, 2016, 11:05 PM), 
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/the-relationship-between-marginal-revenue-
marginal.aspx (explaining the interaction between marginal revenue curves and marginal 
cost curves). 
61 File: Monopoly-surpluses.svg, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, https://commons.wikimedia
.org/w/index.php?curid=5224373  
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welfare. However, there is reason to pause before accepting this analysis. As 
I stated in a blog post titled “Deadweight Loss or Utopian Benefit?”62: 
[T]his analysis is based on comparing the expected behavior of  
a monopolist with a static model of  perfect competition. One 
of  the problems with using a static model is that it fails to take 
into account where we’ve been or where we’re actually likely to 
go. A more dynamic view might prompt questions such as, “If  
monopoly pricing power didn’t exist, would we ever get the 
innovation that creates monopoly power in the first place?” Or, 
“If  perfect competition rarely, if  ever, exists in the real world, 
why are we using it as a benchmark for regulation?” Put another 
way, does it really make sense to regulate away the incentive to 
innovate that is created by monopoly pricing power (and the 
accompanying consumer and producer surplus) merely because 
we theorize that if  we lived in the magical world of  perfect 
competition we’d have even more surplus?63 
In light of  the foregoing, it might “be better to use ‘utopian benefit’ 
rather than ‘deadweight loss’ to describe the difference between what we 
get with monopoly pricing as opposed to what we’d expect to get with 
perfect competition.”64 Such a change could make sense because it is 
“natural to react to a ‘loss’ of  surplus as something that should be made 
up, corrected, or restored – but calls to put innovation at risk in order to 
pursue a ‘utopian benefit’ might lead to more appropriate caution and 
humility when it comes to regulation.”65 
Having said all that, the law already takes much of  this into account. 
As Ginsburg and Wright point out: 
[T]he principle that neither monopoly profits nor monopoly 
pricing is unlawful under the Sherman Act implicitly but 
necessarily involves the presumption that the dynamic benefits 
from innovation and from “competition for the market” will 
outweigh the deadweight losses emphasized in static analysis. In 
the Trinko case Justice Scalia made the connection to dynamic 
considerations explicit when he observed not only that charging 
monopoly prices is lawful but also that “[t]he opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what 
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth.” In this 
example, the presumption of  dynamic benefits from innovation 
 
62 Stefan J. Padfield, Deadweight Loss or Utopian Benefit?, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (June 22, 
2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/06/deadweight-loss-or-
utopian-benefit.html. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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and the introduction of  new products takes the form of  a rule 
of  per se legality with respect to firm pricing decisions.66 
Nonetheless, the next time you hear that monopolies are bad because 
they create deadweight loss, it might still be helpful to rephrase that 
statement to say instead that monopolies may be bad because they may 
deny us utopian benefits.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay I have attempted to give a glimpse into the 34th 
Economics Institute for Law Professors. The three classes I chose to focus 
on constitute less than 10 percent of  the total, and I have only covered 
isolated parts of  those classes. Thus, the reader should not assume they 
now have anything approaching a complete picture of  the Institute. 
The theme I have focused on here is one of  questioning widely held 
assumptions generally understood to support government intervention in 
markets. The specific areas addressed were behavioral law and economics, 
externalities, and monopoly pricing power. While not decisive, the points 
raised in this Essay have the potential to add useful perspectives to the 
ongoing debate about government regulation of  markets. 
 
66 Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 58, at 6. 
